NOTE: The notation (su4) means that the adjacent data was used in the document analyzing the sustainability of the productivity of the world's systems for producing food, fiber and water.

Source used by (96P3): World Bank, "From Scarcity to Security: Averting a Water Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa", Washington DC 1995.

Dregne and Chou (Ref. 18 of (97C1)) estimate the value of production of irrigated cropland at $625/ ha/ year ($95/ ha/ year for rain-fed cropland and $17.50/ ha/ year for rangelands).

Soil salinization costs $11 billion/ year in reduced income. (F. Ghassemi, A. J. Jakeman, H. A. Nix, "Salinization of Land and Water Resources: Human Causes, extent, Management and Case Studies", University of New South Wales Press Ltd., 1995) Comments: These statements are also in the Soil Degradation Review.

The price of water is increasing -- sometimes dramatically-throughout the world. Over the past five years, municipal water rates have increased by an average of 27% in the US, 32% in the UK, 45% in Australia, 50% in South Africa, and 58% in Canada. In Tunisia, the price of irrigation water increased fourfold over a decade.

A recent survey of 14 countries indicates that average municipal water prices range from 66 cents per cubic meter in the US up to $2.25 in Denmark and Germany. Yet consumers rarely pay the actual cost of water.

The average American household consumes about 480 cubic meters (127,400 gallons) of water during a year. Homeowners in Washington, DC, pay about $350 (72 cents per cubic meter) for that amount. Buying that same amount of water from a vendor in the slums of Guatemala City would cost more than $1700.

The price people pay for water is largely determined by three factors: the cost of transport from its source to the user, total demand for the water, and price subsidies. Treatment to remove contaminants also can add to the cost.

The cost of transporting water is determined largely by how far it has to be carried and how high it has to be lifted. China is constructing three canals that are 1156 kilometers, 1267 kilometers, and 260 kilometers long to transfer water from the Yangtze River to Beijing and other rapidly growing areas in the northern provinces.

Pumping water out of the ground or over land to higher elevations is energy-intensive. Pumping 480 cubic meters of water a height of 100 meters requires some 200 kilowatt-hours of electricity. At a price of 10 cents per kilowatt-hour, the cost is $20 -- not including the cost of the pump, the well, and the piping. One hundred meters is not an unusual lift for wells tapping falling supplies of groundwater. In Beijing and other areas in northern China, for instance, lifts of 1000 meters are sometimes required.

Mexico City, at an elevation of 2239 meters, has to pump some of its water supply over 1000 meters up a mountain. The operating costs alone amount to $128.5 million annually. Pumping this water requires more energy than is consumed overall in the nearby Mexican city of Puebla, home to 8.3 million people. Amman, Jordan, faces a similar problem related to delivering water to higher elevations.

In most places water is not purchased or exchanged in a market. But formal water markets are developing in the western US, Australia, and Chile. Where these water markets do exist, they provide examples of how high the scarcity value of the water-that is, the amount that other potential users would be willing to pay for it-can be. Water prices in Australia's markets peaked at near 75 cents per cubic meter in December 2006, climbing 20-fold in a year in part due to prolonged drought. In the US West, water prices typically range between 3 cents and 10 cents per cubic meter. In some western US cities, water is so scarce that cities are selling sewage effluent for as much as $1 a cubic meter to be used for irrigating gardens.

In India, water scarcity has prompted some farmers to profit by selling their water instead of farming. The water they formerly used to irrigate their crops is instead pumped from their wells and trucked to nearby cities.

The final factor affecting how much people pay for water is the amount it is subsidized. Water subsidies can be very large. For instance, water revenues in the city of Delhi (India) are less than 20% of what it spends each year to provide water. On average worldwide, nearly 40% of municipal suppliers do not charge enough for water to meet their basic operation and maintenance costs.

In several Asian cities, households forced to purchase water from a private vendor pay more than 10 times as much as middle-income families who are connected to the municipality's distribution system. The poorest households in Uganda spend 22% of their income on water, while those in El Salvador and Jamaica use more than 10% of their income to satisfy water needs.

Farmers in California's Central Valley use roughly one fifth of the state's water and pay on average slightly over 1 cent/ cubic meter, just 2% of what Los Angeles pays for its drinking water and only 10% of its replacement value. One analysis of a new US project in central Utah found that the water it will provide will cost close to 40 times more than irrigators pay for it.

Water is currently managed as if it were worthless instead of the life-sustaining, valuable, and increasingly scarce resource that it is. A key step in moving toward more rational water management is to place a price on water that reflects its value and scarcity. In Osaka, Japan, users pay a set monthly fee that includes 10 cubic meters of water; beyond that prices increase in steps from 82 cents per cubic meter up to $3 or more for high-volume users. Ensuring that the poorest households are connected to a secure water supply can protect them from price gouging by private vendors.

Reports of US cities paying well over $1.00/ m³ for water are increasingly common (Ref. 34 of (96G1)).

Los Angeles has paid $0.25/ acre-ft. of water that normally costs $100-$200/ acre-ft. Las Vegas has paid $0.50/ acre-ft. (96P1).

The world's irrigation capital investment represents a total capital value of $1.9 trillion (99P1). Comments: That amount would be larger if irrigation systems were required to be built and operated with sustainability in mind, i.e. with a system of drainage pipes under the soil surface.

During 1950-1993, the World Bank lent $31 billion for irrigation projects worldwide (p. 233 of (99P1)).

A 1995 study by the World Bank of more than 190 Bank-funded projects found that irrigation costs now average $480,000/ km² (99P1).

In the Philippines, (inflation-corrected?) costs of new irrigation systems have increased more than 50% since 1970 (99P1).

In Thailand, the cost of new irrigation systems have risen 40% since 1970 (99P1) (Presumably in inflation-adjusted terms).

In India and Indonesia, the cost (in inflation-adjusted terms) of new irrigation more than doubled since 1970 (99P1).

The capital cost for new irrigation capacity in China is $150,000/ km² (90P1).

For large irrigation projects in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand capital costs are $150,000-$400,000/ km² (Ref. 6 of (90P1)).

In Brazil, capital costs of irrigation projects are $600,000/ km² (Ref. 6 of (90P1)).

In Mexico, capital costs of irrigation projects are $1,000,000/ km² (90P1).

In Africa, the capital costs of irrigation systems are $1,000,000-2,000,000/ km². (Ref. 5 of (92P1)) (90P1).

Mexico's irrigated area has dropped since 1985 due to a lack of capital (Ref. 8 of (90P1)). Comments: Population growth requires lots of financial capital to pay for infrastructure growth.

Brazil's irrigation targets seem unlikely to be met given the required capital investments (Ref. 8 of (90P1)).

The cost, globally, of building new irrigation projects has risen markedly, contributing to a 6% decline in per-capita irrigated land since 1978 (97P3).

Ref. (70T1) (p. 53) argues that, since irrigation is strongly capital-intensive, it can succeed only when combined with sophisticated farm technology (including chemical fertilizers and genetically improved seeds).

A weighted average for medium-large irrigation projects in several countries produced an estimated cost of $98,000/ km², with a range of $56,000-$177,000/ km² (70T1). These data are for land in settled areas that don't require extensive clearing. Sprinklers on farm irrigation systems adds about $25,000/ km² (70T1).

A UN report estimates the average cost to salvage irrigation land that has been destroyed by salinization or waterlogging is $65,000/ km² (Ref. 22 of (78B2)). (Obsolete data - for historical purposes only)

In 1975, $16.9 billion was invested as capital in irrigation facilities in the US. Of this, $9 billion was federal investment and $7.9 billion was state- and private investment. The implied average investment was $66,700/ km² in project facilities, and $25,900/ km² for on-farm facilities ((81B1), p. 83).

Irrigation system funding (globally?) has fallen 25-33% since the mid-1970s (96G1). Comments: This presumably is in inflation-corrected terms.

The average cost (worldwide) indicates an average cost of $100,000/ km², ranging from $10,000-$300,000/ km² (70T1). Other interesting analyses of irrigation economics are given on p. 54 of Ref. (70T1).

Although the prevention of secondary salinization is theoretically possible in many developing countries, in most cases the need to construct expensive drainage systems makes the economic expediency of introducing irrigation questionable (Ref. 236 of (88S1) (p. 218)).

Part [A4] ~ Irrigation Economics ~ Irrigation Subsidies ~ US ~

Public Subsidies for Irrigation: (94D1)

• Damage to fisheries and recreation on depleted streams;
• Destruction of anadromous fish stocks, warm water fisheries and whitewater recreation due to the construction of dams;
• Loss of sediment as silt settles out in reservoirs;
• Fish mortality from unscreened diversions;
• Reduction of groundwater tables, leading to well closures and ground subsidence;
• Pollution of water and wetlands with pesticides, fertilizers, salts and trace metals from irrigation tail water and drain water;
• Salt build-up in irrigated soils

The following table compares the actual prices being paid for each acre-foot of irrigation water on various projects with the "full cost" price for irrigation water. "Full cost" is calculated as the cost for irrigation water if full repayment of the irrigation portion of the project, included any deferred Operations and Maintenance, is amortized with interest from the date of construction expenditures.

Of the 44,530 km² of farmland in 17 western US states now receiving water from federal projects, 14,170 km² are owned by agribusiness (81F2).

Robert Repetto places the average subsidy to beneficiaries of US federal irrigation largesse at 83% of full project costs - over $1 billion/ year. (Robert Repetto, "Skimming the Water", World Resources Institute, Washington DC, 1986).

The US Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) recovers 17% of the total economic costs of its irrigation projects - a $1 billion/ year subsidy. In Central Valley California, irrigators (as of the mid-1980s) have repaid only 4% of the capital cost of the Central Valley Project ($38 million of $950 million). Taxpayers paid the rest (Ref. 57 of (93P2)).

The US Congressional Budget Office calculates that, from the inception of the federal irrigation program in 1902 through the mid-1980s, irrigation subsidies totaled $33-70 billion. (Committee on Natural Resources, US House of Representatives, "Taking from the Taxpayer: Public Subsidies for Natural Resource Development", Washington DC 1994).

Farming practices are generally excluded from the list of industries required to report toxic chemical releases to the TRI. Thus, irrigated farming need not report releases of toxic fertilizers and pesticides that reach the environment through aerial spraying, land application, tail-water runoff, drainage water, and groundwater recharge (94D1). Clean Water Act Sect.402 requires generally that all point sources discharging pollutants into the waters of the US must obtain a permit and meet standards for reducing pollutant discharges. Irrigation drainage ditches, however, are specifically exempted from this requirement. The value of this exemption to irrigators is unknown, although the contribution of irrigation drain-water to the pollution of US waters has been partially documented by the Department of the Interior (94D1).

Bureau of Reclamation statistics indicate that US taxpayers paid $534 million to deliver water to western irrigators in 1988 (George Wuethner, Sierra, Sept.-Oct. 1990).

During 1902-1986, total construction cost subsidy in the western US by BOR reclamation programs was $20 billion ($500,000/ km² = 86% of total construction costs) (96P1).

On average, the US government subsidizes irrigation at $54/ acre/ year (1989). Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec) statistics indicate that taxpayers paid $534 million to deliver water to western irrigators (mostly stockmen) in 1988 (p. 394 of (91J1)).

The Bureau of Reclamation's irrigation support programs started with the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902. Major revisions of the law in 1926, 1939 and 1982 resulted in the current basic structure of the Reclamation program, which provides interest-free repayment of the construction costs of major irrigation projects throughout the West. The terms of construction, repayment and operation of these projects provide a number of overlapping policies that cumulatively increase subsidies to irrigation water users. The water subsidy to irrigators is supplemented by a variety of subsidies provided through national agricultural programs. In addition, irrigators benefit from subsidies for water pumping power and river-borne transportation on federally improved waterways and from certain exemptions from environmental laws. Many of these projects also contain a hydropower component, which provides subsidized energy to non-irrigators (94D1).

The Small Reclamation Project Act provides loans through BuRec for improving or expanding existing irrigation facilities at reduced interest rates. The portion of the loan expended on irrigation-related facilities is repaid at 0% interest. The portion of the loan expended on flood control benefits is not repaid at all. The maximum amount of each loan was originally set at $6.5 million of a $10 million project, but with indexing for inflation may now reach $34.2 million out of a total proposed project cost of $51.3 million (94D1).

In 1988, the US Department of the Interior defined the irrigation subsidy as: the difference between the annual Federal cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining the irrigation portion of a project, including interest at a Treasury rate on the capital investment, and the revenues received by the Federal Government toward those costs (94D1).

The report described in Ref. (94D1) describes the complex web of overlapping and sometimes contradictory benefits (subsidies) (price supports, tax breaks, low-cost loans and exemptions from environmental laws) given in mineral extraction, irrigation water, hydropower, timber, grazing and recreation. The federal government provides US Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec) water to farmers and urban consumers in the seventeen Reclamation states. This report focuses largely on BuRec's irrigation water deliveries, because water for urban uses is not intentionally subsidized, and in fact receives far less subsidy (94D1).

A recently released congressionally-mandated report by the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission recommends the federal government put more emphasis on restoring degraded watersheds, transfer water allocations from farms to cities and charge full market value for water from new irrigation projects. The report, which embraced the heretofore heretical view that agriculture needs give way to environmental and urban needs, stated, "A vision is growing that changes must be in the way that we manage water" (98U1).

The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) administers a number of loan programs that support US farmers by providing low-interest non-recourse loans. In addition to the low interest rates, farmers often benefit from the agency's failure to pursue unpaid loans. According to news reports, FmHA writes off an average of $2.3 billion in non-collectible loans annually. In the past five years, the agency has written off $11.5 billion, and continues to carry another $5 billion in delinquent loans on its books. In FY88 and FY89, the agency had total operating losses of $20.7 billion, with $2.8 billion of non-collectible loans written off in FY89. Despite Congressional concern expressed in 1981 over multi-million dollar delinquencies in "emergency loans," many of these delinquencies have not yet been recovered (94D1).

More open markets for water would create incentives for farmers to irrigate more efficiently, and to switch to less-thirsty crops (97P3).

If governments, the World Bank, and development agencies would make a complete accounting of the environmental and social effects of large water projects, a more accurate tally of costs and benefits would tip the scales toward efficiency, conservation, and smaller-scale projects (97P3).

In the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Congress recognized that owners of excess irrigated acreage might reap a windfall profit in the sale of their subsidy along with the excess land. The Reform Act required that excess land sales be executed at a price that reflected the value of the land without the subsidy. Agriculture Department crop program and disaster program subsidies provide similar benefits; a recent calculation estimated that these programs added close to $100 billion to farmland values nation-wide (94D1).

The basic subsidy incorporated into the Reclamation program is the interest-free repayment of the construction costs of irrigation projects, including dams, distribution systems and sometimes drainage systems. Under Reclamation law, the cost of constructing these projects is repaid to the federal government over a 40-50-year period. Irrigators are required to repay the portion of the construction costs allocated to irrigation; that is, that portion of the costs that Bureau of Reclamation determines is the share of the project that supports irrigation. The irrigators, however, pay no interest on the unpaid irrigation construction costs. Thus, Reclamation construction repayment is like receiving an interest-free loan for 40-50 years (94D1).

The federal government pumped more than $2.3 billion in crop subsidies into Iowa last year. If that were an industrial payroll, it would be the equivalent of having a company that employs 50,000 workers and pays them more than $46,000 each.

None of the traditional justifications for farm subsidies stands up to scrutiny.
To guarantee the nation's food supply? Only a few grains and cotton are eligible for subsidies. The majority of food is produced without government subsidy.

To keep food cheap? Although they don't work well, farm programs are meant to raise the price of farm commodities, not lower them. But the subsidized grains make up such a tiny percentage of the final cost of processed food that they have little impact on what the consumer pays anyway.

To save the family farm? What a cruel hoax. Crop subsidies tend to speed the demise of the family farm because the bulk of the payments go to the biggest farmers. That gives them extra cash to buy out the little guys.

The Central Arizona Project (CAP) completed around 1993, diverts water from the Colorado River and delivers it to irrigation projects in central Arizona for $2/ acre-ft. The cost to the US taxpayers: $209/ acre-ft. (99P1).

In order to obtain water necessary to meet the terms of an Indian water rights settlement, the government repurchased the remaining term of its 40-year contract with Harquahala Valley Irrigation District in Arizona. Although all parties acknowledged that the irrigation district could not afford to continue irrigating with the Reclamation water, the irrigation district claimed that the loss of the water was a significant injury. They persuaded BuRec to pay $1050/ acre-foot for the right to the water, in addition to simply canceling the contract. The Interior Inspector General found this bargain overly generous (94D1).

About 20% of the Colorado River's flow goes to California's Imperial Irrigation District (IID) that irrigates nearly 2000 km² of cropland. IID gets the water from the federal government for free. Farmers pay only delivery costs (1 cent/ m³). California uses 14% more Colorado River water than a 1922 interstate agreement entitles it to, and has been put on notice to live within its share. Cutbacks would come out of urban suppliers, since IID farmers have more senior water rights (p. 111 of (99P1)).

The largest project, the Central Valley Project in California, has thus far involved a capital investment of $4 billion to construct several dams and related distribution systems traveling hundreds of miles to supply irrigation water to more than 2.5 million acres of land on almost 20,000 farms. The terms of sale for BuRec water provide a substantial discount to the irrigators compared to the cost of developing and operating the projects themselves (94D1).

The most extreme example of rolling repayment is the Central Valley Project (CVP) in California. BuRec's interpretation of the Reclamation laws led to delaying CVP repayment more than 40 years after the first project water was delivered (94D1).

Grain shipments amounted to 80% of shipments out of the four Lower Snake River reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Columbia Basin transportation system. These shipments paid nothing toward the cost of those four projects that was allocated to navigation. However, these grain shipments benefit from navigational facilities through the lower Basin as well. The total navigational allocation for the facilities that these grain shipments use is $426,721,000. A new lock on Bonneville Dam will raise this to $591,221,000 (94D1).

(New Mexico) Congress authorized transfer of the Vermejo (irrigation) Project in New Mexico to the local district in 1980, with further repayment delayed indefinitely, "until such time or times as the Secretary determines repayment to be reasonably feasible" (94D1).

In 1943, Congress wrote off repayment of all construction costs over $3,080,000 on the W. C. Austin project (then called the Lugert-Altus project) in Oklahoma, reducing the irrigators' repayment obligation by $8,293,000 (94D1).

An irrigation project in northern South Dakota will bring water to 80 farmers who will pay $0.0025/ m³. The cost to the taxpayer will be $0.106/ m³ (81F2) (GAO data).

The Central Utah Project (CUP) delivers water from Colorado River tributaries to Utah farmers at a cost to the tax-payers of $400/ acre-ft. Farmers pay $8/ acre-ft. (p. 231 of (99P1)).

Norman Myers estimates that irrigation subsidies, globally, total at least $33 billion/ year, and if the full costs of environmental damage, human resettlement from dam sites, increased water-borne diseases from irrigation projects, etc. were factored in, the total subsidy would be far higher. (Norman Myers, "Perverse Subsidies: Their Nature, Scale and Impacts", a report to MacArthur Foundation, Chicago IL, 10/97).

Pakistan's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 13% (a $50 million subsidy) (87R1).
Bangladesh's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 1% (87R1).
Indonesia's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 7% (87R1).
South Korea's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 13% (87R1).
Nepal's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 4% (87R1).
Philippines cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 10% (87R1).
Thailand's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 3% (87R1).

In most Third World countries, government revenues from irrigation average no more than 10-20% of the full cost of delivering water (Ref. 54 of (90P1)).

Irrigators in Indonesia, Mexico and Pakistan pay less than 15% of their water's full cost (93P2).

Irrigators of Jordan pay under $0.03/ m³ of irrigation water - a small fraction of the cost to the government (p. 230 of (99P1)).

Tunisia's farmers pay $0.05/ m³ of irrigation water - 1/7th of the Tunisian government's costs of supplying the water (p. 230 of (99P1)).

China's cost-recovery on irrigation projects is 25% (87R1).

In China, water for irrigation etc. is supplied free, or is greatly under-priced. So it is used inefficiently. Beijing urban dwellers get water at a fraction of its real cost (Ref. 4 of Chapter 9 of (95B3)).

In China's dry region, many cities and provinces are raising water prices - sometimes by a factor of three - in order to reduce subsidies (97Z1).

[A7d] ~ Irrigation Economics ~ Irrigation Subsidies ~ Non-US ~ India ~

India heavily subsidizes use of irrigation water by providing electricity for pumping water to farmers at a nominal cost (Sandra Postel, Last Oasis, W. W. Norton & Co., 1997, p. 170).

Less than 10% of the total recurring costs for major and medium-sized irrigation projects built by the Indian government as of the mid-1980s have been recovered (96P1) (p. 230 of (99P1)).

Australia recently slashed public subsidies for water, forcing farmers to use water more judiciously (97Z1).

Desalinization is not a solution to most water problems. To irrigate one km² of corn using desalinization would cost more than $1,400,000/ year plus the cost getting water inland to the corn (98P1).

Typical cost of desalinizing seawater: $1.00-$1.50/ m³ ((99U3), p. 168).

The 1981 cost of desalinating salty water is $0.24/ m³ (plus brine disposal costs) (81S3).

About 7,500+ desalinization plants create 4.8 km³/ year of fresh water (0.1% of global fresh water use (Ref. 14 of (92P1))). The cost of this water is $1-2/ m³ (Ref. 15 of (92P1)). (See Section (2-C) for more information on desalinization.)

The world's 7500 desalting plants have a capacity of 4.8 km³/ year = 0.1% of world water use. Desalted water costs $0.81-$1.62/ m³. The cost for desalting brackish water is $0.41-.65/ m³ (91W2).

The average urban dweller pays $0.24/ m³ for delivered water (91W2). The energy cost of desalted water is 4.9 kw-hour/ m³ for the most efficient method (91W2).

The theoretical minimum energy required to remove salt from seawater is 2.8 million joules/ m³, but even the best desalinization plants use 30 times that amount (Ref. 24 of (96P2)). Comments: This suggests an efficiency of less than 10% at best.

C.P.I. is used on 24,000 km² in the US. Each system covers 0.53 km² in a 0.65 km² square. The cost of each system is $50,000. The electrical cost is $1500-$2500/ year (same as for a sprinkler system) for 0.65 km². Labor cost is $346/ km²/ year (compared with $990/ km²/ year for a sprinkler network). C.P.I. uses 40% less water than ditching does - and it can be used in rolling terrain (76O1).

Center-pivot irrigation systems cost $55,000 each in 1979 (79A1). (Obsolete data - for historical purposes only.)

Drip-irrigation water-use efficiency can be 80-95% (compared to 70-80% for sprinkler systems, and 50% for furrow systems (77S1).

Capital cost of drip-irrigation systems: from $120,000 up to $250,000/ km². A recently developed system cuts the capital cost to $25,000/ km² (p. 178 of (99P1)).

Collectively the 2000 km² of irrigated crops of the arid- and desert zones represent 10-15% of the value of agricultural production of the arid zones, and almost 100% of the total production of the desert regions. Irrigated agriculture is rather non-productive. Lack of drainage causes excessive salt deposits or hydro-morphology or both (70L1).

About 4000 km² of irrigated pasture require 5.7 km³ of water/ year - as much as an urban population of 23 million (90L1). Pasture, the single largest water use in California, is an extremely low value crop, worth $94 million gross in 1986 (90L1).

The energy input for irrigation in California is analyzed in Ref. (77K1). Total primary energy for irrigation is 23 billion kW-Hour (12% of the energy required by California agriculture) (77K1).

The product value of irrigation water in Egypt is $0.03/ m³. The cost of producing desalinated water by nuclear energy is at least $0.25/ m³ (76E2).

A proposed drainage system covering only a small portion of (irrigated lands of) Egypt's Nile Delta has been priced at $1 billion (89P2).

Israelis reduce water requirements 30-40% by switching from sprinkler systems to drip-irrigation (77A2).

The product value of irrigation water in Israel is $0.18/ m³ (76E2). Israel's irrigation system can feed 1000 people/ km² - compared to a global average of 250 people/ km² (77A2). Comments: This data was copied to Chapter 2 on 9/21/04 - where it ought to reside.

Japan's total industrial water-use peaked in 1973 and then dropped 24% by 1989. Industrial output, meanwhile, climbed steadily. As a result, the value of output from each m³ of water supplied to Japanese industries rose from $21 in 1965 to $77 (in real terms) in 1989 - a more than tripling of industrial water productivity (97P3).

In the early 1970s, Gaines Co. Texas farmers pumped water for irrigation at $0.0012/ m³. In the early 1980s the cost was $0.0049/ m³ due to increased fuel costs, and because the water table has dropped 3.9 meters (Ref. 57 of (81S3)). By 1995, fuel price increases and water-table depletion will eliminate irrigation in 32 counties on the Texas panhandle (USDA study) ((81B2), p. 26).

In the US, 127 water transactions were reported in 12 western states during 1991. Most water was being sold by farms and bought by cities (97P3).

Irrigation uses 5% of agriculture's energy requirements (Ref. 3 of (77K2)).

Ref. (70T1) gives a table that compares populations, resources, land areas, irrigated area, cropland area, 1965 crop income, 1965 farm income, 1965 livestock income for the arid western states of the US.

Revenues collected from farmers cover an average of less than 10% of the cost of building and operating public irrigation systems (87R1). The cheap water goes primarily to richer farmers and is often used to grow surplus crops. In the US along, taxpayers finance $1 billion/ year of water subsidies (87R1).

According to BUREC figures, western US farmers received an irrigation subsidy from the federal government of $534.3 million in 1986 -$13,300/ km² of irrigated land (88M1). Nearly 40% of that cheap federal water was used to grow crops that the government deemed surplus (cotton, rice, wheat, corn, oats, barley, sorghum, soybeans) (88M1). Federal taxpayers subsidize the irrigation of crops that are then eligible for federal subsidies (price supports, marketing loans, etc.) - all to the tune of $900 million/ year. During 1976-1985 an average of 15,000 km² of US irrigation was used to produce surplus crops (88M1).

Irrigators in the Vernal unit of the Central Utah Project pay $909/ km² for water that costs $50,540/ km² (88M1). North Platt Project (NB and WY) farmers pay $54/ km² for water that would carry an unsubsidized price of $2020/ km² (88M1). Central Valley (CA) irrigators pay the BUREC $0.005/ m³ of water -water that cost $0.06/ m³ to produce (85K1).

The desalinization cost for the Wellton-Mohawk Project is to be $0.264/ m³ - more than 10 times what the water is worth to the farmers (87P1). The economic problems resulting from federal subsidies for irrigation projects producing surplus crops, etc. are reviewed in Ref. (87C1).

(See Section (6-A) [9]~for more data on irrigation water use efficiency.)

Falkenmark and Lundquist (95F1) argue that, 'Few countries, if any, have a well-functioning system for allocating water between competing demands and needs.'

Worldwide, subsidies worth at least $650 billion/ year, equivalent to 9% of all government revenues, support logging, mining, oil drilling, livestock grazing, farming (including irrigation), fishing, energy consumption and driving (94U2) (98R1) (99R1).

Worldwide, 214 river or lake basins, containing 40% of the world's population, now compete for water (Refs. 55, 61 of (94K1)).

A decade ago, US intelligence services identified 10 potential flash points where war could break out over water (98S1).

More than 200 river basins in the world are shared by at least two countries. More than a dozen nations get most of their water from rivers that cross the borders of neighboring countries that can be viewed as hostile (98S1).

"We underpay for water almost everywhere. That's one of the biggest problems with water worldwide". Peter Gleick, director, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development (97Z1).

The political nature of societies based on irrigation is discussed in Refs. (74H2), (74L1), and (74K1). They discuss Wiltfogel's concept of "Oriental Despotism", etc. Being politically without influence, the hydraulic farmer maintained a man-nature relationship that included unending drudgery on a socially and culturally depressing level (56W1).

The fundamental political problems promoting the demise of irrigation systems are alluded to on p. 123-4 of Ref. (76E1).

The major problems of water resource development and operation are not technical, but relate to the socio-political situation (74F1). (The author (a hydrologist) is reasonable certain that most, if not all, the water projects he designed will meet the same fate as the ancient Middle-Eastern irrigation projects people now find buried in the sands.)

Political problems with the distribution of irrigation water in Peru are outlined in Ref. (70C2) (p. 369). These problems reduce the efficiency of water use significantly.

An excellent history of western US water law is given in Ref. (84D1).

The economics, politics, etc. of the desalinization of the Lower Colorado River and the Wellton-Mohawk Project are discussed in Ref. (87P1).

Construction promoters have long been a dominant force in irrigation development, to the detriment of those who pay the bill and derive so few benefits ((70T1), p. 54).

The excesses, shady deals, and blatant fraud associated with some of early water development schemes in the western US have been documented in Cadillac Desert by Marc Reisner, and Congress in its Wisdom by Doris O. Dowdy (90L1).

Progress in US salinity control has been disappointing. The delay in implementing control measures, where they have been planned, is not because of lack of technical feasibility or cost-effective measures. It is primarily because of political opposition from those who contribute the most to downstream salinity. Potential effective salinity-control measures have been skirted because those who would pay for them do not envision any benefit for themselves in return. Instead, the focus has been on measures whose costs can be borne broadly, through federal funding, even if they are not the most cost-effective control measures (85E1).

China uses irrigation to produce 70% of its food. China's irrigation water is often diverted to the industrial and urban sectors in times of scarcity.

There are now at least 2000 registered independent environmental groups in China. These groups are growing in number and influence. It seems almost inevitable that the central government of China will increasingly rely on these groups for public education campaigns, environmental watch-dogging and ensuring environmental accountability at the local level as the government continues to decentralize environmental decision making.

People to use 35 times as much water as they did 3 centuries ago (98S3). Comments: Is this per-capita?

About 60% of the world's irrigation systems are less than 50 years old. (p. 255 of (99P1)) Comments: Since some decades are normally required before the effects of salinization set in, clearly the losses of irrigated land productivity are far smaller now than they will be in decades to come.

Ref. (99P1) sees a trend from large public irrigation projects to small private projects. It also sees irrigation expansion in many areas reaching the point of diminishing economic returns.

An excellent history of irrigation's role in early human history is given in (56W1) (43 refs.). Effects of irrigation-based agriculture on the character of government are of particular interest, as are the effect of irrigation-based agriculture on population density (56W1). Historical records of the past 6000 years show that civilized man, with few exceptions, has never been able to continue a progressive civilization in one locality for more than 800-2000 years. In most cases, civilizations grew for a few centuries, then declined or were forced onto new lands (Ref. 2 of (85G1)).

In early history of human civilization, hydraulic civilizations covered a vastly larger part of the Earth than did agrarian civilizations. Prior to commerce and the industrial revolution, the majority of all human beings lived within the orbit of hydraulic civilizations ((56W1), p. 161).

On irrigated lands (e.g. Egypt) population densities were 180-280/ km². Comments: It is of interest to compare the above numbers with the modern-day human carrying-capacity of tropical rainforest under shifting cultivation - about 10/ km². (See the forest degradation literature review.) It is also of interest to compare the above figures to Dregne and Chou's estimate (Ref. 18 of (97C1)) of the relative value of production of irrigated cropland ($625/ ha/ year) to that of rain-fed cropland ($95/ ha/ year) ($17.50/ ha/ year for rangelands).

Before white man, 75% of the total population of the Americas (North, Central, and South) lived in relatively small "hydraulic" (irrigated) regions (3 refs. in (56W1)).

Irrigation was basic to Hohokam Indian settlements in southern Arizona and among the Magollan Indians of central Arizona (74V1).

Water-control devices were noticeably present in the Kayenta during 1150-1300 AD (74V1).

Irrigation began in the Mesa Verde (in the southwestern US) area possible as early at 900 AD. The area was abandoned around 1300 AD (74V1).

By 1050 AD, a population of 10,000 Anasazi people was crowded into an area 14.5 km. x 1 km. in Chaco Canyon (74V1).

Though fishing was the economic mainstay of Peruvian coastal societies in 1800 BC, by 1600 BC irrigation had opened the desert to intense exploitation, and farming was the primary means of support. In the Ancon-Chillan-Rimac region, canal irrigation began around 1750 BC. With the Spanish conquest (1532 AD), the amount of land under irrigation decreased, and many areas farmed in pre-Hispanic times have yet to be reclaimed (74M3). Pre-Hispanic terraced land once covered 10,000 km² in Peru. 80% of this land has been abandoned (Ref. 8 of (92P1)).

Sections of the Alps have been irrigated for at least 1000 years (74M2). Valais was irrigated from the 11th to 12th centuries AD (74M2).

The great hydraulic civilizations of India and China maintained themselves for 3000-4000 years, and hydraulic civilizations in Peru lasted only 1000 years. Societies of feudal Europe and Japan had an even shorter duration ((56W1), p.160).

The final collapse of the artificial irrigation system of southern Arabia between AD 542-70 diminished enormously, the agricultural productivity of southern Arabia (56H1).

Mesopotamian Society reached its zenith between the third and seventh centuries A.D. Irrigation had been extended to nearly all arable land in the region (50,000 km²) 40% more than Iraq's total irrigated area today. By the 7th Century A.D., salt build-up had reached damaging levels in parts of the plain (99P1).

Mesopotamia is possibly the world's oldest irrigated area. At its zenith, Mesopotamia supported 17-25 million people. Today Iraq has a population of 10 million, and on the portions of these same lands that have not been abandoned, peasants eke out some of the world's lowest crop yields (76E1).

As early as 2400 BC, a drastic increase in salinity in southern Iraq seems to have been linked to the cutting of a new irrigation canal by Enternena of Girsu. By 2100 BC, salinization had spread westward toward the Euphrates. The area never recovered (74G1). The northern part of the plain experienced a salinization crisis between 1300 and 900 BC (74G1).

An excellent historical account of the Mesopotamian Irrigation System is found in Ref. (74M1) and in the article following it by M. Gibson ("Violations of Fallow and Engineered Disaster in Mesopotamian Civilization") (74G1). Major salinity damage occurred in Mesopotamia between 2400 BC and 1700 BC (Ref.1-5 of (85G1)). Mesopotamia's irrigation ditches were wrecked by Mongol invaders during the 13th Century AD, but the immense piles of silt alongside showed that the system was well on its way toward destruction by then (56S1). The history of irrigation in the Deh Luran Plain (just east of the Tigris-Euphrates River system) is given in Ref. (74N1). It covers the Sassian and early Islamic period (AD 226-800) and the Later Islamic Period (AD 800-1250).

In 8400 BC, agricultural yields were 2537 liters/ ha. (Respectable by current North US standards). In 2100 BC, yields were 1460 liters/ ha, and by 1700 BC, yields had dropped to 897 liters/ ha. (76E1). Thus it is argued that the growing soil salinity unquestionably played a major role in the breakup of the Sumarian civilization (Ref. 2 of (76E1)). The first recorded civilization, the Sumerians, thrived in the southern Tigris-Euphrates Valley by the 4th Millennium BC. Over 2000 years, Sumerian irrigation practices ruined the soil so completely that it has never recovered (76W1).

Siltation of Mesopotamia's irrigation system is described in detail in Ref. (76E1). Huge mounds of silt, once cleared from irrigation canals, are still a central feature of the landscape in parts of central and northern Iraq (76E1). Mesopotamia's irrigation system collapsed in the 12th Century AD. Mongol invaders in the 13th Century found scenes of devastation (76E1).

In developing a soil map of the Near East, Dudal found that the most characteristic feature of soils in that region was the wide occurrence of saline soil (71R1).